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John Stewart [COSTECH] 
Armen Khatchatourov [COSTECH] 
In very general terms, a technical artefact 
becomes transparent when the sensorimotor 
contingencies !! "#$%&'()&*&'+ ,&$*($-#$,.+ &'+
/#0#$/#$,.1 have been assimilated and become 
second nature; concomitantly the interface 
itself, as such, drops out (disappears) from 
consciousness, to be replaced by a presence 
of objects and the actions that the user is 
performing in the world. 
A classical illustration is the case of a blind 
person who does not feel the stimulations by 
the cane in her hand, but rather senses the 
pavement directly at the end of the cane. 
Another classical example is the tactile-
vision substitution systems !! "#$%&'.+ %23%*(*24
*(&$+ %.%*#)%1. Initially, the subjects are con-
scious of the interface device itself, and 
tactile stimulations are felt on surface of the 
skin. Progressively, with increasing famili-
arity, the subjects no longer feel the tactile 
stimuli; instead, they have a perception of an 
external object located out there in a distal 
space (see also !! 56*#'$78(97*(&$:+0#',#0*2781). 
The situation is similar for the actions the 
person performs: when driving the car, I do 
not pay attention to the car itself, which is a 
transparent mean of my action. [Merleau-
Ponty, 1945]. 
Conversely, if there is a breakdown or a 
dysfunction, the interface as such will come 
back into consciousness, and obliterate the 
world of objects !! ;#,<$(,78+ 7'*#=7,*%:+)&/#%+ &=1. 
A profound philosophical discussion of this 
issue is provided in Heidegger’s Being and 
Time. See [Dreyfus, 1990] for an accessible 
presentation in English. 
This scheme applies both to interfaces 
with the real world and with virtual reality. 
Transparency, as thus defined, is closely 
related to believability !! >#8(#?73(8(*.@+ABC1. 
It follows that the transparency is not a 
term which applies to a tool or to an inter-
face, as such; rather, it applies to the whole 
situation of interaction, and it corresponds to 
the degree of mastery of the sensorimotor 
contingencies achieved by the subject. This 
leads to the vast subject of learning, and the 
developmental acquisition of skills. 
;+.+-+#%+/!
[Dreyfus , 1990] Dreyfus H.L. (1990). Being-in-the-
World: a commentary on Heidegger’s Being 
and Time. MIT Press. 
[Merleau-Ponty, 1945] Merleau-Ponty, M., 
Phenoménologie de la perception. Gallimard, 
Paris, 1945. 
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